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Abstract. In this paper, I will present the empirical version of the slippery slope argument (SSA) in the field 
of genome editing. According to the SSA, if we adopt germline manipulation of embryos we will eventu-
ally end up performing or allowing something morally reprehensible, such as a new coercive eugenics. I will 
investigate the actual possibility of sliding towards eugenics: thus, I will examine enhancement and eugenics 
both in the classical and liberal versions, through the lens of SSA. In the first part, I will discuss the classi-
cal eugenics from a historical perspective and conclude that classical eugenics is morally deplorable; but by 
currently accepting genome editing I argue that it is not possible to ‘slip’ into classical eugenics. Then, I will 
analyze liberal eugenics: I will consider Habermas’ and Sandel’s objections to liberal eugenics and genetic 
human enhancement. Subsequently, I will reply to these arguments affirming that, although it is not possible 
to refuse any form of genetic enhancement, liberal eugenics would not consider the principles of justice, non-
maleficence, and non-instrumentalization; hence, it should be considered not morally acceptable. In addition, 
I will support the thesis according to which the possibility of relapsing into liberal eugenics is more likely than 
relapsing into classical eugenics. Then, I will present a strategy that, while avoiding falling into the undesirable 
scenarios related to SSA, still accepts some application of germline genome editing of embryos and gametes. 
In such a way, I will show that even if we accept the plausibility of a certain slip into an undesirable scenario, 
SSA does not offer conclusive reasons to forbid any use of germline genome editing technique in both thera-
peutic and enhancement fields.
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Introduction: the slippery slope argument in the 
field of genome editing 
The slippery slope argument (SSA) is one of the 
most relevant argumentative strategies in the discus-
sion on human germline modification. SSA is widely 
considered throughout the bioethical debate: in fact, it 
is often used in relation to issues including abortion, 
euthanasia (1) and assisted fertilization. According to 
SSA, allowing germline genome editing treatments 
would lead to an uncontrolled sliding towards danger-
ous and undesired scenarios, such as an eugenics drift 
or the acceptability of enhancement practices; hence, in 
order to avoid such scenarios, germline genome edit-
ing treatments, for both therapeutic and enhancement 
aims, should be banned. In textbooks of logic and on 
writing in ethics, SSA is often classified as an informal 
fallacy, that is an argument whose stated premises fail 
to support their proposed conclusion (3). However, in 
this paper I will focus on the more compelling em-
pirical or socio-psychological version of SSA (4-6): 
according to this version, due to the acceptance of 
germline genome editing, a gradual acceptance of ge-
netic enhancement could infect the moral sensitivity of 
society, eventually leading to a new coercive eugenics. 
Indeed, some psychosocial features could make it dif-
ficult to clearly distinguish between ethically accept-
able uses of genome editing, such as therapeutic uses, 
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and unacceptable ones (7). Genome editing is the first 
technique that enables a positive modification of fu-
ture generations and therefore requires careful analysis. 
I will discuss the concepts of eugenics, both in the clas-
sical and the liberal version, and of genetic enhance-
ment, through the lens of SSA. Only after having car-
ried out an in-depth ethical analysis of these concepts 
and having verified the actual undesirability of some 
scenarios and the real possibility of the occurrence 
of others, the soundness of the SSA can be assessed. 
Appreciating these concepts and the historical-cul-
tural context will enable to understand which possi-
ble consequences could reasonably occur by allowing 
germline genome editing practice on human beings. 
Indeed, according to Anneli Jefferson, Empirical SSAs 
almost always require an assessment which takes into 
account the cultural and political context in which the 
argument is put forward (7). Therefore, I will present 
a strategy that, while avoiding falling into the undesir-
able scenarios related to SSA, still accepts some ap-
plication of germline genome editing of embryos and 
gametes. In such a way, I will show that even if we 
accept the plausibility of a certain slip into undesir-
able scenario, SSA does not offer conclusive reasons to 
forbid any use of germline genome editing technique 
in both therapeutic and enhancement fields.
In this paper, I assume a mixed theory that accepts 
the “lexical” priority (8) of deontological reasons. From 
this perspective, a priori constraints on the production 
of maximum aggregate wellbeing are established on the 
thesis of the people rights. Such rights should be con-
sidered as claims that people have by nature or based 
on a certain agreement or original contract, and they 
cannot be violated in the name of better consequences 
for society. Once we assessed that a specific action does 
not violate any right, we have to evaluate whether its 
consequences do not lead to a future scenario in which 
rights could be violated. In this case, I maintain that we 
have good reasons, based on a deontological perspec-
tive, to prevent the beginning of this course of action. 
Furthermore, I also consider consequentialist reasons 
to evaluate two or more actions which respect people 
rights in both current and future scenarios. To assess 
which action is the most ethically legitimate, we should 
identity which action produces the best consequences 
from an aggregate wellbeing perspective. Indeed, ac-
cording to the lexical priority, consequentialist reasons 
should be taken into account only after assessing that 
deontological ones are respected.
Specifically, the rights of liberty and autonomy 
should be guaranteed by fair equality of opportunity 
and this essentially translates into some limitation on 
the excessive accumulation of wealth and the guaran-
tee of equal educational and health opportunities for 
everybody. I also assume that treating people as mere 
means and not also as ends in itself (9), even though 
for overall community wellbeing, is ethically question-
able: despite rights-based ethical theories are often in 
contrast the Kantian idea, that is human dignity is an 
unnegotiable concept which does not depend on sub-
ject’s freedom, I believe that these two models are not 
necessarily in contrast. It is reasonable to affirm that 
a person has the right not to be used as a mere mean 
by others, although this action could lead to positive 
or non-negative consequences for her: the right not to 
be exploited makes people able to consider themselves 
free and equal from a moral perspective.
The aforementioned strategy adheres to Tom 
Beauchamp’s and James Childress’ proposal which 
provides a common ground where both moderate de-
ontologists and teleologists could converge (10). In 
short, I will take into account not only the principles 
of liberty, autonomy and non-instrumentalization but 
also non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice.
Eugenics: a controversial concept
During the second half of the 19th century, after 
the diffusion of Darwinian evolutionary theory, some 
disturbing proposals were formulated: one of these is 
eugenics which received concrete political and scien-
tific application during the 1870-1950 period. In this 
period, the eugenics movement, originating in the 
United Kingdom, collected such a large consensus as to 
involve scientists and political institutions from all over 
the world. The term “eugenics” was coined by Francis 
Galton who called it “the science of improving stock, 
which is by no means confined to questions of judi-
cious mating, but which, especially in the case of man, 
takes cognisance of all influences that tend in however 
remote a degree to give to the more suitable races or 
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strains of blood a better chance of prevailing speedily 
over the less suitable than they otherwise would have 
had”(11). In his book Hereditary Genius, Galton stud-
ied the phenomena of the distribution of talent and the 
biological hereditariness, and came to two conclusive 
considerations: a) the number of talented person within 
families with a good social, moral and intellectual sta-
tus is significantly higher than in the overall popula-
tion; b) talent is distributed according to the Gaussian 
curve and therefore is reasonable to affirm that both the 
number of talented people and the number of individu-
als with lower intelligence would decrease over time due 
through a regression toward the mean (12). According 
to the author, moral and social norms of solidarity and 
compassion undermine the driving force of evolution, 
that is natural selection. This process contributed to 
human degeneration and it was exacerbated by another 
aspect: the tendency of so-called “unfit” individuals to 
reproduce more and, as a result, to outweigh the num-
ber of “fit” ones. As a consequence, Galton proposed 
some measures in order to save the fit traits of human 
species from an inevitable degeneration: a) positive 
eugenics, which aimed to guarantee and promote the 
reproduction between individuals with moral, physi-
cal and intellectual qualities above average; b) negative 
eugenics, which sought to prevent the increase of unfit 
persons through sterilization, abortion and contracep-
tive methods. It is important to remember that these 
measures, according to Galton, were not supposed to be 
the object of State imposition but of the citizens’ free 
choice: from this perspective, the eugenics project was 
intended as a sort of civil religion (13). However, after 
the success of the Galtonian thesis around the world, 
the eugenics movement raised significant interest in 
different national states which promoted eugenics poli-
cies in both positive and negative form. The content of 
such programs varied according to the different states; 
nevertheless, over time there has been a widespread 
ideological-political use of the eugenics implications 
aimed at generating consensus. This “populist turn” 
mixed the original Galtonian convictions with ideo-
logical beliefs such as racism, classism, and nationalism 
(14). It was no longer the scientific genius that had to 
be sought through the eugenic practices but the purity 
of the race or the preservation of the middle class: in 
fact, coercive policies were introduced, e.g., restrictions 
on immigration, the prohibition of mixed marriages, 
racial segregation, and mandatory sterilization. Albeit 
these measures were also introduced by states such 
as Sweden and the USA, the emblematic case of the 
application of eugenics principles was certainly Nazi 
Germany. In this context, in order to preserve the pu-
rity of the “Aryan Race”, mandatory sterilization pro-
grams and physical elimination of the unfit people were 
implemented; furthermore, mixed marriages between 
“Aryans” and Jews or other minorities were banned and 
finally the systematic extermination of ethnic, religious, 
and homosexual minorities was carried out (15). 
Ethics of Eugenics
Overall, eugenics is a controversial chapter of hu-
man history, especially with regard to the relationship 
between ethics and science. Regardless of the different 
applications, the whole eugenic movement was based 
on ideological premises and scientific mistakes. The 
ideological premises are the following: 
a) racism, i.e., a common belief spread during the 
19th century that was systematically theorized by Jo-
seph Arthur de Gobineau (16). According to such a 
belief, more equipped and less endowed races may be 
identified;
b) classism, according to which the richest per-
sons are carriers of superior phenotypic traits, which 
are the expressions of genes in an observable way rang-
ing from behavior through morphology and intellec-
tual capabilities. Conversely, lower class individuals 
carry unworthy traits. Class discrimination started to 
be practiced around the 18th century (17);
 c) nationalism, or the political conception that 
gives centrality to being part of a nation because of 
shared biological characteristics like common blood or 
social ones such as culture, language, religion, politics, 
and belief in a shared singular history (18). During the 
19th century nationalism became one of the most sig-
nificant political and social forces in history due to the 
ethnic and national revolution in Europe (19). 
The scientific mistakes involved in this project 
were: 
a) nowadays, as a consequences of DNA screen-
ing, it has been assessed that there is only one human 
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race: Homo sapiens, though within which there are 
significant variations in the possible somatic traits as 
adaption to different contexts. Therefore, the belief 
according to which that only individuals with certain 
somatic traits can reach certain intellectual levels is de-
prived of any scientific support (20-22);
b) the eugenists believed that the condition of hu-
man beings in life reflected their abilities and this could 
be used to assess the quality of their genes. That is, 
the fact that certain individuals showed certain “social 
diseases”, including poverty, prostitution, drunkenness 
and criminality, demonstrated that they were unfit and 
justified the exclusion of their reproduction. Today, the 
relationship between genetic basis and behavioral traits 
are still not clear, although recent studies suggest that 
some phenotypic behavioral traits, such as propensity 
to practice extreme sports (23) or having higher level 
of intelligence (24) may have a genetic basis. However, 
it is known that the majority of phenotypic traits de-
pend decisively on a series of environmental factors: 
hence, predisposition caused by genes does not neces-
sarily imply the realization of certain behavior;
c) eugenics advocates believed that human genetic 
pool was in decline because of social inclusion projects 
which were against evolution’s natural tendency to 
favor the “fit” individuals . Hence, they believed that 
humanity needed an active contrast of such projects. 
However, there is no scientific evidence showing the 
existence of a relationship of inverse proportionality 
between civilization and genetic wellbeing. This was 
a scientifically unfounded convictions dictated by an 
irrational fear; 
d) Finally, the prescriptions of eugenists for ge-
netic improvement could not have had a significant ef-
fect on society. Having no way of identifying carriers 
of recessive genes and a sufficient knowledge of the 
genetic heritage, it was not possible to identify fit and 
unfit individuals. In some cases, the eugenists admitted 
the poor effect of eugenics but they argued that these 
results justified the interventions. 
Due to these considerations, it is easy to acknowl-
edge that the eugenics movement is ethically prob-
lematic and objectionable. In this period there was 
a constant violation of human rights: firstly through 
objectification, denigration, segregation, secondly with 
involuntary sterilization and finally, in the extreme 
case of Nazi Germany, through mass extermination. 
The eugenics movement perpetrated racial and class 
prejudice and this makes the negative reputation of 
this phenomenon well deserved.
Bold Liberal Eugenics
According to some bioethicists, classical eugen-
ics is certainly morally wrong, but not because of the 
initial pursuit of improving the genetic pool of hu-
man beings (25); eugenics applications were ethically 
problematic because, in many cases, they did not leave 
individuals the possibility of formulating free and 
autonomous choices. Indeed, the main controversial 
aspect of eugenics was not considering rights, prefer-
ences and wishes of the individuals involved. On the 
contrary, some forms of genetic selection and genetic 
treatments currently available, or that will be available 
in the future, are morally defensible even though they 
share common traits with the eugenics movement. 
From this perspective, the social and cultural context 
of western democracies promotes the autonomy of in-
dividuals who are guided in their choices by their own 
view of the good: for instance, a couple may wish to 
have a child without Tay-Sachs or sickle-cell anemia 
and at the same time desire for it a specific eye or hair 
color. These choices would not be imposed by a third 
party but would be the result of a parents’ free choice. 
Enhancing the offspring through of germline 
modification could be considered morally appropriate 
if and only if the parents’ decisions are free from im-
positions of the State. Allowing parents to choose the 
eye color or to enhance mathematical intelligence of 
their progeny should be morally on a par with allowing 
parents to teach their children certain religious values 
or force them to learn to play the piano. Therefore, a 
genetic change or an environmental influence, such as 
education, would have the same moral weight if they 
led to the same ends and had the same degree of desir-
ability. In line with these arguments, Robert Nozick, 
within his philosophical theory of “minimal state”, 
proposed a “genetic supermarket” allowing parents to 
design their children: “this supermarket system has the 
great virtue that it involves no centralized decision fix-
ing the future humane type(s)” (26).
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Moderate Liberal Eugenics
However, the promotion of parental procreative 
autonomy does not always make eugenics free from 
controversy. The advocate of a milder view of liberal 
eugenics, Nicholas Agar, states that not every type of 
genetic reproductive treatment should be considered 
ethically appropriate (27). In fact, such interventions 
could compromise the child’s right to an open future. 
In other words, suppose a deaf couple would like to 
have a deaf child and a new genetic technology that 
enables the modification of early embryos to make 
them affected by permanent deafness is available; the 
couple does not conceive deafness as a physical im-
pairment but as a sort of cultural identity that would 
guarantee a life experience as rich as that of a non-deaf 
individual. Instead, according to Agar, deafness would 
compromise a considerable number of opportunity for 
the future individual’s life plan; such a restriction to 
the freedom of offspring is quite controversial, thus 
genetic treatments for this purpose should be prohib-
ited. In general, treatments considered ethically ap-
propriate should be only those that do not exclude life 
plans based on conceptions of the good life radically 
opposed to the parents’ view. This is recommended be-
cause some parents’ wishes could convey the prejudices 
of a certain historical age: John Mackie in this regard 
states: “If the Victorians had been able to use genetic engi-
neering, they would have made us more pious and patri-
otic”(28). Sticking to my previous example, since the 
deaf couple’s son will not be able to totally distance 
him or herself from the situation imposed by the par-
ents, a germline modification aimed at intentionally 
imposing a trait such as deafness is not ethically ap-
propriate. On the other hand, the enhancement of in-
telligence or of other functions which grant the future 
individual an increase in the opportunities for the re-
alization of her life plan, could be considered morally 
defensible. 
Habermas and the self-understanding of human 
nature 
Liberal Eugenics is strongly criticized by Jürgen 
Habermas in his book The future of human nature. Ac-
cording to Habermas, genetic engineering blurs the 
dividing line between the nature we are and the or-
ganic equipment we give to ourselves. He affirms that 
there is a difficulty in distinguishing between negative 
and positive genetics, i.e., between the elimination 
of diseases and the enhancement of human abilities; 
within this context, liberal eugenics advocates deny to 
individuate a clear boundary according to the notion 
of illness and they preferer renouncing any limitation, 
promoting individual choice and market rules. This 
perspective is concerning because genetic engineering 
interventions that overcome the boundaries of thera-
peutic aims may undermine our ethical self-under-
standing as members of the human species and affect 
the self-understanding of a genetically programmed 
person (29). 
The whole point of Habermas’s critique is that 
liberal eugenics would compromise individual auton-
omy and equality between generations. Any form of 
genetic enhancement would disturb the moral self-un-
derstanding of the new individual who would no long-
er be able to conceive herself as an autonomous person, 
namely, the author and the responsible subject of her 
own life. In fact, the genetically modified individual 
would no longer have the possibility to consider herself 
as the undivided author of the her own life’s conduct. 
As a result, she would not even have the possibility of 
being considered responsible for it. She would share 
the responsibility for her conduct with a third person 
who changed her genetic pool before her birth: hence, 
the programmed person could not conceive the pro-
grammer’s intention as a natural casual fact. This could 
generate a sort of alienation from herself (29). 
Furthermore, human dignity, conceived as the 
symmetry of the relations between human beings in 
which they recognize themselves as equal, would be 
violated. According to Habermas, dignity is not a 
quality that humans possess by nature, such as intel-
ligence or eye color; on the contrary, dignity exists only 
within a community of moral beings who give them-
selves laws to all the relationships they have (29). As a 
consequence, liberal eugenics would not compromise 
only the self-understanding and the moral agency of 
the programmed person; it would also give rise to an 
asymmetrical interpersonal relationship that would 
jeopardize the possibility for human beings to conceive 
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themselves as equal. Under normal circumstances, the 
social difference between child and parent, over the 
generations, is continuously cancelled with the growth 
of children; instead, the genetic dependence of a modi-
fied child by her parents establishes a social relation-
ship that compromises the normal reciprocity of sub-
jects who are equal in their moral value.
It could be noted that, with regard to the ethical 
autonomy to lead one’s own life, the situations of the 
modified and the unmodified person are not so dif-
ferent: both never have the freedom to choose their 
genetic heritage which is configured as a given. How-
ever, Habermas states that the genetic programming 
of certain physical and psychical qualities raises critical 
issues to the extent that it fixes the modified individual 
to a certain life plan which is chosen by parents. From 
this perspective, the liberal analogy between geneti-
cally modifying a child and shaping it through edu-
cation is not consistent; in fact, in the latter case, the 
child-student can always take a critical distance from 
the socialization process, making herself free in a ret-
roactively perspective. Contrarily, genetic manipula-
tions cannot be corrected ex-post: so a “critical self-(re)
appropriation” by the individual is not feasible and no 
revisionist learning process is allowed. In this context, 
genetic engineering would promote a sort of unaccep-
table instrumentalization of human beings: the indi-
vidual would not be considered as an end in itself, in 
the sense that he would not be considered the author 
of a conduct of life-oriented by its own claims. 
In conclusion, according to Habermas, any posi-
tive eugenics interventions, such as PGD (Preimplan-
tation genetic diagnosis) for non-medical reasons and 
germline genome editing treatments aimed to enhance 
the future child’s characteristics, should not be allowed. 
However, this does not mean that every genetic treat-
ments should be forbidden; indeed, with regard to ge-
netic treatments for undoubtedly serious and univer-
sally recognized diseases, on which we can assume an 
implicit consent of the future individuals, Habermas 
considers such interventions legitimate. Furthermore, 
pre-implantation diagnosis for hereditary diseases im-
posing extreme suffering could also be considered ethi-
cally appropriate. 
A reply to Habermas
Habermas seems to support the thesis that there 
are conclusive moral reasons against genetic enhance-
ment; hence any genetic enhancement treatments 
should be considered illegitimate. However, this ap-
proach raises some objections. According to Allen Bu-
chanan, Habermas provides no explanation of why a 
person who develops from a modified embryo should 
conceive herself or should be conceived by others as less 
free than other persons (30). That would be true if and 
only if germline genome editing rendered that indi-
vidual incapable of living autonomously. As long as the 
genetic design does not destroy the biological basis for 
the individual developing in a being with the capacity 
for autonomy, the individual can be the “author” of her 
own life. This does not exclude that modified individu-
als can still consider themselves morally different from the 
unmodified individuals, or be considered morally dif-
ferent from those who are not modified. However, this 
is an empirical psychological prediction, not an obvi-
ous truth, and Habermas provides no argument in this 
regard. In addition, some psychological studies seem to 
show that Habermas’ predictions are empirically false 
(31, 32): these pieces of research suggest that there is 
no negative effect on the psychological development of 
a child born after PGD for non-medical reasons com-
pared to a naturally conceived child. Moreover, accord-
ing to Julian Savulescu, even in cases of sex selection, 
children seem not to show signs of negative effects (33). 
Habermas’ argument according to which the ge-
netically modified individual would be fixed to a cer-
tain life plan (FLPA) is particularly effective in refer-
ence to the bold liberal eugenics perspective, i.e., the 
position maintaining that parents should be allowed to 
decide privately any genetic modifications on embryos 
of their progeny without any limitations. However, 
Habermas’ critiques become less effective with respect 
to the moderate position, where parents would have 
the possibility to modify progeny, yet not in complete 
discretion. Although Habermas’ arguments are effica-
cious to several and bold genetic modifications, it does 
not follow that others genetic enhancements on prog-
eny are ethically questionable.
In addition, it should be pointed out that fixing 
the future individual to a certain life plan does not 
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mean undermining her autonomy. The FLPA should 
be considered ethically relevant regardless of the valid-
ity or otherwise of the argument according to which 
genetic enhancement would compromise the autono-
my of the future individual. FLPA is consistent with 
Buchanan’s view according to which both a manipu-
lated individual and an individual generated without 
genetic manipulation would have a genome that is 
given and not chosen: in this context, both individu-
als have the same biological basis to be autonomous. 
Regardless of this, the attempt made by parents to in-
tentionally tie the future individual to a given life plan, 
should be considered ethically questionable. To clarify 
this point, let us hypothetically consider an embryo 
that is modified in order to become the new genius of 
classical music: the individual derived from this em-
bryo is surely autonomous, free to make life choices 
as indeed was Beethoven whose genome was certainly 
not modified; however, by manipulating that embryo, 
parents have made the future individual more inclined 
to classical music, thus predisposing her to a certain 
life plan. We cannot deny that our physical and psy-
chical features shape our choices and our life plans, al-
beit not univocally. In our example, the individual who 
is manipulated to become the new genius of classical 
music at some point in his existence could “feel” a kind 
of affinity with classical music; being gratified by this, 
she could approach the world of music. In fact, there is 
a reasonable likelihood that a person who has an atti-
tude for some activities is gratified in practicing them. 
On the other hand, it is unlikely that a person who has 
no talent for some activities finds in them a life plan 
or a great passion: human beings tend to pursue more 
frequently the activities that best suit their aptitudes. 
Additionally, being aware of the genome modification 
of the child and wanting for the child a specific life 
plan as a classical musician, parents would encourage 
the child to undertake the study of classical music; this 
would, even more, push the individual towards a future 
chosen by parents. In short, the fact that the autonomy 
of the enhanced individual is not harmed does not en-
able parents to carry out genetic interventions in full 
discretion. By fixing the offspring to a specific life plan, 
parents would consider their future son as a mere mean 
and not as an end in herself. However, this argument 
is insufficient to advocate an unconditional rejection of 
every form of genetic enhancement. In fact, providing 
the offspring with a greater nonspecific intelligence, 
which does not fix the individual to a specific life plan, 
would not seem a form of instrumentalization. On the 
contrary, providing a specific predisposition to classical 
music should be considered ethically questionable.
Michael Sandel: Mastery and Gift 
Another prominent argument against enhance-
ment is proposed by Michael Sandel in The Case Against 
Perfection. According to Sandel the core problem with 
genetic enhancement is the drive to mastery: “what 
the drive to mastery misses, and may even destroy, is an 
appreciation of the gifted character of human powers and 
achievements” (34). Eugenics and genetic enhancement, 
in fact, represent an unilateral triumph of wills over 
natural gifts, of domination over reverence, of mod-
eling over contemplation. The Promethean impulse of 
domination pushes the individual to redesign nature, 
losing the capacity to accept human life as a natural 
gift. The urge to program and cancel the contingencies 
through genetic engineering corrupts parenthood as a 
social practice governed by rules of unconditional love. 
From this perspective, the maternal and paternal affec-
tion should not depend on talents and traits that the 
child possesses but on “an openness to the unbidden”, 
that is a quality of character that restrains the impulse 
to mastery and control over progeny (34). As William 
May points out, parental love has two aspects: accept-
ing love and transforming love. Accepting love affirms 
the being of the child, whereas transforming love seeks 
the wellbeing of the child: each side of parental love 
corrects the excesses of the other (35). However, ac-
cording to Sandel, the balance between the two forms 
of love is undermined by genetic engineering. Further-
more, eroding the consideration of the sense of gifted-
ness, genetic enhancement treatments could lead to a 
change of key terms of our moral vocabulary, namely, 
humility, responsibility, and solidarity (34). Firstly, if 
people became accustomed to genetic enhancement, 
the social foundation of humility would be weakened: 
that is because only the awareness that talent and skill 
are not entirely dependent on human beings, but also 
depend in part on chance, can reduce their propen-
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sity to hybris. Secondly, genetic enhancement could 
imply an increase in parental responsibility: parents 
would be responsible for having chosen or not cho-
sen the characteristics of their children and this would 
call for a moral overload. Such a scenario could lead 
to the misuse of genetic testing or to the stigmatiza-
tion of non-enhanced or disabled individuals. Finally, 
genetic enhancements would make it more difficult 
to cultivate the moral sentiment of social solidarity. 
Conceiving talents as fruits of fate, the individual will 
be more inclined to share the results obtained with 
people who, without their fault, do not have the same 
talents. The awareness that no one is fully responsible 
for her own success saves the meritocratic society from 
the comfortable certainty that success is the reward of 
virtue and that the rich are rich because they are more 
deserving than the poor: no longer offset by chance, 
meritocracy would become more severe and less un-
derstanding. Thus, the absolute control of the genome, 
according to Sandel, would undermine the solidarity 
that arises when men and women reflect on the casual 
character of their talent and their lucks.
A reply to Sandel 
It is reasonable to say that also Sandel fails to of-
fer a satisfactory argument against all forms of genetic 
enhancement. Firstly, according to John Harris, the 
concept of giftedness in quite controversial: in fact, it 
is not clear why we have to recognize and accept the 
gifted nature of normalcy but not the gifted nature of 
disease (36). Sandel could answer to this critiques af-
firming that medical intervention to cure or prevent 
illness, or restore the injured to health does not under-
mine the concept of life as a gift because it does not 
desecrate nature but honors it (34); by contrast, genetic 
enhancements would be considered as a form of hubris 
of the designing parents, in their drive to master the 
mystery of birth. By using the aforementioned expres-
sion of “openness to the unbidden”, Sandel thus main-
tains that this is good when it is part of a non-disfig-
uring relationship between parent and child. However, 
he does not provide any convincing reason to ground 
this statement but only rhetoric reasoning (36), since 
Sandel does not give any reasonable criteria to draw 
the ethical distinction between therapy and enhance-
ment: Harris suggests that there is a continuum be-
tween treating dysfunction and enhancing function 
which invites us to consider the benevolent motives 
and life-enhancing outcomes of both. (37).
Secondly, even assuming the sense of giftedness 
as a central human good, parents might want to ge-
netically enhance their future son without having an 
impulse to mastery. For example, an increasing life-
span enhancement would not hide any inclination to 
dominate others and the sense of giftedness would 
seem preserved. Furthermore, for a hypothetical future 
individual who is potentially able to live much longer, 
more than anyone else, there would still be plenty of 
things to sustain the sense of giftedness. In fact, with 
Buchanan we can say that enhanced people would 
still die of accidents; wars presumably would still oc-
cur even though many of us would not want them to; 
deadly pandemics presumably would still arise, despite 
our best efforts to avoid them; people would still fall 
in love with people who do not love them and fail in 
every effort to make themselves loveable (30). These 
considerations seem to suggest that humility, respon-
sibility, and solidarity would not be incompatible with 
every forms of genetic enhancement. However, it’s rea-
sonable affirming that seeking boundless enhancement 
exhibiting an impulse of domination incompatible 
with good human life should be considered a negative 
idea. There is no doubt that, at a certain point, the de-
sire for a perfect child could corrupt the parents’ virtue 
to still be open to welcoming others. Nevertheless, it 
seems difficult to argue that this concern provides a 
decisive reason against any form of enhancement.
General considerations on enhancement
Bearing in mind the above considerations, we can 
affirm that Habermas’ and Sandel’s arguments fail to 
provide a conclusive reason for rejecting genetic en-
hancement altogether. However, at the same time, we 
can take the recommendation of these arguments to 
formulate a neither too permissive nor too restrictive 
approach on genetic enhancement. In fact, as I said, 
some of the fears expressed by these two prominent 
philosophers are reasonable and noteworthy. As a 
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consequence, we should adopt a view that evaluates 
the pros and cons or the risks and benefits of various 
forms of genetic enhancement through a case by case 
analysis. This view does not assume any kind of con-
sequentialist or utilitarian outlook. It states that it is 
appropriate to take all considerations into account, not 
only with respect to the consequences but also with re-
gard to a deontological perspective. Such an approach 
is quite similar to what Buchanan calls “Balancing 
view”(30). In order to support this approach, we need 
to redirect the ethics of enhancement by abandoning 
the questionable framing assumptions regarding a dis-
tinction between historical improvements and genetic 
enhancement. 
Enhancement is here defined as the set of tech-
niques aimed at improving certain abilities and func-
tions over the normal human range. Therefore, en-
hancing human beings means allowing them to do 
what normal beings are not able to do. In these terms, 
we should note that enhancement cannot be limited 
to the genetic context but is omnipresent in human 
history. In fact, literacy and numeracy are among the 
most important cognitive enhancements: for example, 
literacy increases our cognitive abilities, allows us to 
understand the past through reading written archives 
and increases not only the mnemonic capacity but also 
the ability to reflect on our experiences and to give 
them meaning (30). From this perspective, historical 
improvements, even if they cannot be conceived as 
“genetic”, must also be intended as forms of enhance-
ment of human beings. Hence, there is no reason to 
believe that genetic enhancements are morally more 
problematic than historical ones. 
The problematic aspect of enhancement is not 
in the enhancement in itself but in the ways in which 
enhancement is achieved. Indeed, enhancement treat-
ments could be imposed on individuals who do not 
desire to receive them and this would compromise 
their autonomy. Furthermore, some enhancements 
could lead to situations of social injustice, inequality 
and discrimination of non-enhanced individuals: as 
Daniel Wikler notes, both classical eugenics and lib-
eral eugenics raise important questions of justice with 
reference to the possible distortions of equity caused 
by the advantage gained to individuals through some 
improvements (25). This is why enhancement, both in 
the historical sense and in the genetic (or biomedical) 
sense, must not be rejected in itself. A balanced view 
is appropriate to evaluate case by case the ethical ap-
propriateness of the specific types of genetic enhance-
ments.
In light of these considerations, we can say that 
genome editing for enhancing progeny is morally ap-
propriate to the extent that these treatments respect 
the principle of non-maleficence and the principle of 
non-instrumentalization of future individuals, and the 
principle of justice so that it does not create or exacer-
bate social divisions or unjustified inequalities in soci-
ety. Consequently, Liberal Eugenics, especially in the 
more extreme formulations, should be rejected: even 
though the liberal eugenics argument is appealing be-
cause it promotes procreative autonomy of parents and 
refuses a specific “genetic ideal” promoted by the State, 
some genetic enhancing treatments might undermine 
the principles mentioned above.
Back to the Slippery Slope
It is worth repeating the undesirability of a slip 
toward an eugenics scenario in its classical sense: the 
eugenics movement, during the 1870-1950 period, 
perpetrated repeated violations of human rights, pro-
moting ideologies such as classism and racism and 
violating the dignity of the human being. Actually, 
the return to classical eugenics seems unlikely. More 
precisely, a scenario in which human rights are con-
tinually compromised by coercive actions and by racial 
and class discrimination seems improbable. After the 
Second World War, western states paid great attention 
to human rights. Due to the atrocities committed by 
Nazi Germany, the centrality of the dignity and re-
spect of the individual was reiterated in the “Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights” of 1948 (38). Further-
more, the spread of democratic values in the West and 
western Europe has changed the relationship between 
society and the individual: nowadays, a coercive inter-
vention of society on citizens’ body is considered inad-
missible and every medical intervention, not only ex-
perimental but also therapeutic, is bound by informed 
consent (39). In addition, the disability, homosexual 
and ethnic minorities’ rights movements have made 
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enormous progresses in promoting greater awareness 
of such rights among institutions and public opinion 
since the second half of the twentieth century (40). 
Hence, there is a reasonable likelihood that permitting 
germline genome editing would not compromise the 
principles mentioned above to such an extent that this 
scenario is again realized. The historical assumptions of 
classical eugenics cannot be found in the mainstream 
thinking of contemporary western society and for this 
reason it can reasonably be argued that a similar move-
ment cannot recur. 
Nevertheless, in some regions of the world, ideo-
logical prejudices such as racism, nationalism, and 
classism are still widespread and, in this context, the 
regulation of new practices that improve the gene pool 
of the unborn child will have to be carefully analyzed.
Although a return to classical eugenics would be 
considered not likely to happen, supporting the pos-
sibility of a slide towards liberal eugenics seems instead 
more plausible. Indeed, accepting germline genome ed-
iting would pave the way to a future scenario in which 
it would be conceived morally acceptable to “shape” and 
enhance future individuals based on the parents’ per-
sonal choices and wishes. The socio-cultural context 
may suggest the possibility of a progressive social ac-
ceptance of the perspective described above: the prin-
ciples of procreative autonomy and pluralism, which 
are the basis of the liberal view, are widely recognized 
within western contemporary societies. Although we 
conceive sex selection for non-medical reasons as a 
negative selection, this practice is widely accepted from 
a moral standpoint by people in the countries where it 
is legally allowed; acceptance of other forms of genetic 
enhancement could, therefore, occur easily as soon as 
the technology reaches a sufficient level of progress. 
Furthermore, Sandel notes that contemporary Ameri-
can society already embodies some tendency to the ex-
ploitation of children who are subject to the wishes of 
their parents: the latter often demand too much effort 
from their offspring in sports and the school context 
(34). In line with Sandel’s statement, Natalie Colaneri 
and colleagues observe that the diagnosis of attention 
disorders has increased dramatically over the last 20 
years. According to the authors, this may be ascribed 
to an ambiguity of the diagnosis due to an unclear dis-
tinction between therapy and enhancement and, above 
all, high parental expectations of their children and the 
parents’ way of conceiving of their style of parenting 
(41, 42). Due to the practical possibility of adhering 
to unlimited genetic enhancements, there is a plausible 
likelihood that they will be accepted inaugurating “a ge-
netic supermarket” aimed at achieving the most dispa-
rate wishes of parents. Hence, the uncritical acceptance 
of germline modification would lead to the actual risk 
of a gradual acceptance of practices that could compro-
mise the principles of justice, non-instrumentalization, 
and non-maleficence towards offspring. Nevertheless, 
I believe that there is a strategy for admitting germline 
genome editing treatments in order to enjoy the un-
questionable advantages of this practice, without neces-
sarily sliding towards an undesirable perspective.
Avoiding slippery slope argument: a proposal
The strategy here proposed stands in stark con-
trast to the libertarian perspective according to which 
genome editing, both in therapeutic and enhancing 
applications, should be regulated by purely market 
dynamics. However, it also rejects models that would 
allow only therapeutic interventions and prohibit all 
forms of enhancement.
I support a strategy that consists in admitting, as 
well as therapeutic interventions, some parental re-
quests to genetically enhance their progeny. In order to 
be considered legitimate, genetic enhancement treat-
ments should respect the following criteria: a) they 
must not conflict with the interests and well-being of 
the future individual (principle of non-maleficence); b) 
they must not violate the principle of non-instrumen-
talization of offspring (principle of non-instrumentali-
zation); c) they must not generate unjustified inequali-
ties or undermine access to any social positions for 
other non-enhanced individuals (principle of justice).
However, it could be reasonably objected here 
that in this way the SSA in its empirical version is not 
avoided at all. Allowing, at first, certain enhancements 
could lead to a scenario in which many other enhance-
ments would eventually be allowed, thus ending up 
in accepting the perspective of liberal eugenics. This 
strategy would not provide any conceptual distinction 
and effective methods to avoid the possibility of a psy-
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cho-social acceptance of an undesirable scenario. To 
guarantee the purposes of the strategy, and at the same 
time avoid to slipping “down to the slope”, it is appro-
priate to set up an advisory and authorization body: its 
main purpose would be to assess which enhancements 
are legitimate and which are to be considered inappro-
priate, through a case-by-case analysis. 
With the aim of developing this proposal more 
comprehensively, I briefly recall the case of the Hu-
man Fertilization and Embryology Authority (HFE 
Authority). The latter is a public body of the United 
Kingdom Department of Health which regulates in 
vitro fertilization practices, artificial insemination, 
gamete and embryo cryo-conservation, and human 
embryo research. This body includes not only doc-
tors, researchers, scientists but also economists, jurists, 
bioethicists, religious authorities, and individuals who 
report personal experiences in the area of  assisted re-
production. Established in 1990, the HFE Author-
ity has the task of supervising and regulating medical 
treatments associated with technological develop-
ments in this field (43). Therefore, it is not a matter 
of entrusting to a body only the implementation and 
monitoring of the legislative requirements; HFEA has 
the power to regulate in good part the medical treat-
ments associated with technological developments in 
the sector (44). The institution of such authority not 
only makes laws (and ethical and social considerations) 
suitable for a field of medicine subject to rapid changes 
but also allows a case-by-case approach to evaluate the 
interests at stake (45). Parents make requests to the 
HFE Authority; the requests are analyzed by a com-
mittee which can provide or deny authorization to 
the requested practice. In the context of genetic in-
terventions, I support an authorization model that is 
in contrast to the laissez-faire regime that character-
izes liberal eugenics, which subordinates all interests 
to the principle of parental procreative autonomy. An 
example of HFE Authority work is the case of Nicole 
Maserton’s parents, a 3-year-old girl who died in an 
accident. Shortly after her death, parents contacted the 
HFE Authority to be allowed to use PGD in order 
to select a female embryo. Already having four male 
sons, they wanted to “rebuild the female dimension” 
of the family. In this case, the HFE Authority did not 
authorize the request, because it did not consider the 
practice of sexual selection acceptable for purposes 
other than that of avoiding genetic disorders (46).
The HFE Authority experience is significant to 
face the issue of genetic treatments and enhancements 
of progeny. From this perspective, the authorizing body 
should examine the parents’ requests for enhancing 
children and evaluate their compliance with the princi-
ples of non-maleficence, non-instrumentalization, and 
justice. Moreover, the possible social consequences re-
sulting from the authorization body’s decisions should 
be considered. The authorization body should also pro-
vide support and consultancy service (47) to couples 
intending to enhance their future children: in this way, 
it would promote the parents’ autonomy to decide in a 
fully informed way but also consider and guarantee the 
interest of future individuals and society. Additionally, 
such a committee should guarantee equity among soci-
ety avoiding social division and unjustified inequality.
Conclusions
It has been argued that the SSA, in its empirical 
formulation, cannot always be rejected. Indeed, con-
vincing arguments exist in order to show that admit-
ting certain genetic manipulation practices may lead to 
the acceptance of inappropriate interventions. How-
ever, it is wrong to deduce that the general prohibition 
of germline genome editing is the only way forward. In 
my opinion, the strategy proposed offers a reasonable 
embankment to the slide towards liberal eugenics. The 
Authorization model appears convincing because it 
would allow greater procreative autonomy and would 
promote a reasonable control in the field of human ge-
netic enhancement, which inevitably harbors signifi-
cant risks. While a general prohibition appears unjus-
tified, an excessive form of laissez-faire could lead to 
the progressive acceptance of a scenario in which the 
principles of justice, non-maleficence and non-instru-
mentalization would be continually violated, making 
genetic interventions ethically unacceptable and not 
desirable. In light of this, the establishment of a body 
composed by experts who assess the ethical and social 
appropriateness of the individual enhancement cases 
is a strategy that deserves to be taken into account in 
new genome-editing techniques’ debate.
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